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The very fact that I have been asked to par-
ticipate in a program of thi s s ignificance is indicative 
of an ever increasing problem that is facing all face ts 
of the medical profession-that is, how to stay in the 
hospital and out of the courtroom. I shall be talking 
about some of the general considerations all of you, 
as anesthesiologists, anestheti sts. and phys icians, 
should keep in mind in o rder to understand your 
legal responsibilities to the patient. 
The topic ·'Recent Developments" is partially 
a misnomer because what I am going to address 
myself to is the recent trends or developments in 
three particul ar areas of the law as it affects the 
field of medicine, and then attempt to relate these 
particularly to the field of anesthesiology. You must 
also understand that "recent" medic ally and " recent" 
legally may in fact be years apart. What are com-
monly referred to as recent legal theories, freq uently 
find their origin in court dec isions several decades 
old. At the same time, some of what follows is of 
such recent vintage as to be classified by a vintner 
as green. 
First, I would like to discuss the phys ici an's 
duty to inform his patient and the recent legal de-
velopments in the area of informed consent. Sec-
ond, I will discuss briefly the area of potential 
contract liab ility which is somewhat rela ted to in-
formed consent. And last, some of the more class ical 
legal problems involving a ph ysic ian and his patient , 
with special emphas is on the Captain of the Ship 
Doctrine and respondeat superior. 
While the time has not yet ar rived, and hope-
fully never will , when a physician cannot go about 
his daily tasks without having a copy of Gray's 
Anatomy in one hand plus Corpus Juris in the o ther, 
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education as to the legal aspects of the practice of 
med icine in rece nt years has or should become a 
required co urse of study in our nation's medical 
schools and colleges. It is with thi s thought in mind 
that I prese nt to you today's disc ussion. 
Informed Consent. The Doct rine of Informed 
Consent is the child of the Doctrine of the Inviola-
b ility of the Individual Body, a concept born of the 
common law. Thus, it was stated in a recent case 
that " Anglo-American law starts with the premise 
of thorough-going self-determination; each man is 
considered to be master of his own body and he 
may, if of sound mind, expressly prohibit the per-
fo rm ance of life-saving surgery, or other medical 
t reatment , and while a doctor might well believe 
that an operat ion or a form of treatment is desirable 
or necessary, the law does not permit him to sub-
stitute his own judgment for that of the patient by 
any form of artifice or deception" (I) . 
It is because of this deep-rooted concept th at, 
prior to any trea tment , a phys ici an must obtain his 
patient's conse nt. Valid consent to treatment can be 
obtained in any of several ways. First, the physician 
can obtain th e express consent of the patient. This 
is done either ora lly or in writing, and most hospitals 
now have some type of consent form , though fre-
quently inadequate. Second , consent may be implied 
in fact. Implied in fact consent occurs when a pa-
tient knowingly accepts trea tment , as in rolling up 
his sleeve fo r an injection or agrees to an examina-
tion by lying on the examining table. Third, consent 
may be implied in law. Such consent occurs when 
the patient comes to a hospital unconscious or an 
emergency condition arises whereby he is unable to 
acknowledge his consent to treat ment. Finally , con-
sent may be given by a parent or guardian in the 
case of a child or incompetent. 
For various reasons, the consent given may be 
a nullity. For instance, the consent may have been 
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given by one who had no autho rity to give it , or it 
may have been obtained by fraud o r misrepresenta-
tion on the part of th e phys ician. While most phy-
sicians are aware of these traditional reasons fo r 
invalidat ing a consent , a re lati ve ly new reason fo r 
such has developed in recent yea rs. Thus, courts 
have held with increasing frequency th at a pati ent 's 
consent must be in fo rmed and in te lligent in orde r 
to be va lid . The patient must have a clea r under-
standing of what procedure is to be performed on 
him and the risks and poss ible compl ications in-
volved . A d isclosure that fa ll s short of this test can 
inva lidate the consent given just as thoroughly as 
if it had been obtained th rough fraud. 
While actions at law have always been avail -
a ble to pa tients aga inst thei r phys icians fo r fraudu-
lentl y induced consent o r fo r operat ions perfo rmed 
without consent , o nly recently have actions at law 
bee n maintained by patients who allege that although 
the ir consent was given, it was inva lid due to the 
phys ic ian's fa lling short of his duty to inform . This 
new right of ac tion appea rs to have its genesis in 
the dictum' of a V irginia case, Hunter v. Burroughs 
(2), decided in 19 18. In this case, the pl aintiff was 
suffering from ecze ma and the defendant/ phys ician 
recommended x- ray trea tment as a cure. Back in 
19 14 such a trea tment was revolutiona ry, and the 
defendant fa iled to wa rn the plainti ff of the ri sk of 
poss ible burn involved in its use. The pa tient suf-
fe red severe burns and sued his phys ician on two 
theories. Fi rst, he alleged th at the trea tment had 
been admin is tered negligently; and second. he a l-
leged th at the phys ic ian fa iled to wa rn him of the 
poss ible dangers o f x-ray trea tment. The court af-
fi rmed a judgment fo r the pla in tiff on h is negligence 
th eory and thus did not have to reac h the issue of 
informed consent. However, in a d ictum, the court 
laid the ground work fo r later court decisions on in-
fo rmed conse nt ( 3). 
The bas is of such an action is that a patient 
cannot give a va lid consent to a treatment which he 
knows little o r nothing about. The inviolab ility of 
the indi vid ua l body necess itates tha t any consent 
given must be based on in fo rm ation necessary to 
make the consent intelligent and freely given. This 
includes the dut y of the phys ic ian to d isc lose to his 
patient all relevant in formation concerning a p ro-
t Dictum-a statement o f a principle of law in a de-
ci sion by a court whi ch was suggested by the case but was 
no t necessa ry fo r a dec ision o f th e case as dec ided. 
posed treatment , including the collateral ri sks and 
complications attendant to the treatment , so that 
the patient's consent would be an intelligent one 
based on complete info rmation. The modern action 
based on a lack of info rmed consent did not fully 
develo p until 1960 in the case of Natanson v. Kline 
( 4), a case very simil ar factu all y to the Hu nter case. 
In the Natanson case, M rs. Natanson had un-
dergone surgery for the removal of a cancerous 
les ion in her left breast. A s a precautionary measure, 
her phys ic ian. Dr. Kline, advised that she undergo 
radiation therapy to prevent further spread of the 
cancer. Mrs. Natanson consented to such treatment , 
but as a resul t of it , suffered seve re burns. Subse-
quentl y, Mrs. Natanson brought an action aga inst 
her phys ici an on th e theory th at the consent to 
trea tment was not info rmed. The Supreme Court 
of Kansas held th at Dr. Kline was under the affirma-
tive duty to make reasonable disclosure to Mrs. 
Na tanson, allowing her to make an intelligent de-
cision whether o r not to take cobalt treatment. This 
duty included disclos ing the ri sk inherent in the 
proposed course of trea tment, bu t was limited to 
the disc losu re only of facts necessary to form the 
bas is of an intelligent consent. 
In defin ing this bas is, the court held th at the 
degree of disclosure is to be measured by the stand-
ard of what a reasonable medical practitioner would 
disclose to his patient under the same or similar cir-
cumstances. Thus, th e patient must introduce expert 
medical testimony in o rder to establish the commu-
nity standard as to di sclosure. Once such testimony 
is p roduced, it becomes a jury question as to whether 
the defend ant/ phys ic ian fa ll s sho rt of this standard. 
Acknowledging the li ab ility of a phys ician to 
his patient fo r failure to prov ide sufficient informa-
tion necessa ry fo r an info rmed consent , the question 
arises as to what type of action is to be main tained 
by the patient. Th e courts th emselves are somewh at 
confused in this rega rd but generally the- action is 
b rought on one of two theories : th at of assault 1 or 
th at of neglige nce. It is important to understand 
th e d ifference between an action fo r assault and an 
action for neg ligence. In the fo rmer, the essence 
of the action being the un authori zed touching of the 
patient 's body, the consent given, if there is any, 
I T he term tec hnica ll y should be .. battery .. which is an 
unau th or ized to uching of a no the r·s pe rson : however, the 
co urt s have no t bee n co nsiste nt in the use of thi s term , 
freque ntl y using .. assa ult .. in pl ace of it. The word .. assault .. 
is used ge nerica ll y to in clude both . 
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must be a complete nullity due to some misrepre-
sentation or omission by the physician. On the other 
hand, negligence connotes the breach of some duty 
or standard of care imposed upon the physician. An 
example of an action for assault or un authorized op-
eration is the case of Bang v. Charles T. Miller 
Hospital (5) , in which the patient was suffering 
from a urin ary problem and, after consultation with 
the attending physician, consented to a transuretheral 
prosta tic resection . The physician, however, fa iled to 
inform the patient that in doing the operation the 
spermatic cords would be cut and that the operation 
would render him sterile. The court held th at the 
failure of the physici an to disclose this essential 
fact rendered the plaintiff's consent invalid and 
hence, supported an action for assa ult. One of the 
key fac tors in an action based on assault is that lack 
of skill in performance of the opera tion or procedure 
is of no concern . The operation or trea tment may 
have been performed in the most sk illful manner 
but if there was no consent-informed consent-the 
plaintiff is entitled to recover damages from the 
physician. No expert testimony is needed in such 
a case. 
A case closer to home is that of Woodson v. 
Huey ( 6), where prior to an operation the patient 
informed his physician that under no circumstances 
did he want a spinal anesthetic administered to him 
and was assured by the phys ician th at he would 
receive a general anesthetic. The patient's wish was 
entered in his record by the physic ian . However , the 
anesthetist administered a spinal anesthetic following 
which the patient suffered paralys is. The court held 
the anesthetist liable for assault but not the surgeon. 
The fact th at the spinal was given in a perfectly 
proper manner was of no consequence in an ac tion 
for assault (7). 
A negligence action, on the o ther hand , requires 
the pl aintiff to show that (a) the ri sk was recog-
nizable and the physician's duty of care required 
the disclosure of that ri sk; (b) had the patient 
known of the ri sk, he would not have consented ; 
and ( c) no justification existed for the physician's 
failure to disclose the risk ( 8). Th e plaintiff must 
prove the first element by expert testimony estab-
lishing the community standard and showing that the 
physician's ac tions fell short of that standard . The 
second element necessarily involves the subjective 
intent of the patient and can be established by his 
simply testifying that had he known of the ri sk, 
he would not have agreed . The third element comes 
into pl ay only if the pl aintiff can establish the first 
and even then would require expert testimony to 
establish the requirement of disclosure. ( A few 
courts have placed the burden of proving this third 
element on the phys ician rather th an on the patient, 
the effect of which is to create a jury issue in such 
cases.) 
If these three elements are shown by the plaint-
iff, he has made out a prim a facie case, and the 
defendant must counter by showing that he in fact 
did make adequate disclosure or that under the 
accepted standards, disclosure was not required . 
Although a few courts still treat informed con-
sent cases as an action for assault , the great majority 
of jurisdictions are getting away from this theory and 
are trea ting such as actions sounding in negligence; 
thus putting them in the same category as an 
action for mistrea tment (9). Thus, in the case where 
the community standard is to secure consent to the 
administration of a spin al anesthetic during child-
birth, it may be malpractice, th at is, an action for 
negligence, where such consent is not procured prior 
to the ac tu al giving of the spinal anesthetic (IO). 
Exactly what the courts require to make con-
sent effectual is at the present time in a state of 
confusion . The Arizona Supreme Court has set down 
a good rule in defining consent : 
Consen t is effectual if the co nsentor under-
stands substant ia ll y the na ture of the surgica l pro-
cedure attempted a nd the probable results of the 
ope ration. Thi s, as a matter of law, constitutes an 
informed conse nt. Given a n informed con-
sent, liability if any must be predicated in mal-
practice ( I I ) . 
Coupled with the foregoing rule is the corollary 
being adopted by more and more courts that the 
primary duty of a physician is to do what is best 
for his patient , and th at a physician may withhold 
disclosure of information regarding any risks or com-
plications of the operation or treatment where a full 
disclosure would be detrimental to the patient's 
total care and best interest ( 12) . Thus, when in the 
physici an's professional opinion, informing the pa-
tient of certain of the risks or complications would 
make the patient unduly apprehensive and increase 
the ri sk of complications during surgery, informa-
tion may be withheld . However, let me emphas ize 
th e importance of making a notation of such action 
on the patient's chart and, if appropriate, informing 
the patient as soon as possible after the surgery has 
been completed. 
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What then, as a nesthesio logists, should you do , 
and tell your pa tients prior to the administra tion of 
anesthes ia? Unfor tuna tely, there is no ha rd and fast 
rule which can be sta ted as to the circumstances 
unde r which you can withhold mak ing a full dis-
closure and as to the kind of info rmation which can 
be wi thh eld . Each case must of necess ity depend o n 
its own particul ar fac ts. 
However, there are some bas ic guides th at 
should be kept in mind: 
I. Examine the pa ti ent prio r to administering 
a nes thes ia. prefe rab ly the night before and 
this should be mo re tha n a cu rsory exam i-
nat io n. Make a no tat ion in the cha rt of the 
date and ti me of your exa min atio n, the fi nd-
ings. and any appropri ate orde rs. Any doubt 
as to the patient 's condition should be cla ri-
fied beca use you will be held responsible fo r 
what could have been d iscovered by a 
proper phys ical examinat io n. In the case of 
Butler v. Layton. ( 13) negligence was fou nd 
in the administrat ion of ether to a pa tient 
suffering from a bad cold when the pat ient 
developed acute bro nchiti s which was ca used 
by the a nes thetic. H owever, whe re evidence 
is produced by the phys icia n th at a pro per 
physica l exa mination was give n to the pa-
tient pr ior to administering the anes thet ic , 
liability on this ground is usua ll y avo ided 
( 14 ). 
2. Expl a in ge ne rally th e type of anest hetic to 
be administered, what will happe n. and th at 
there are ri sks a nd complica tions atte ndant 
to any medica l procedure . Depending upon 
the pat ient's condition and emotio nal sta-
b ility, ma ke your dec isio n as to how fu ll a 
di sc losure should be made. A fa irly detailed 
expl anation of what will take place may be 
of inva lu able help si nce fear of the unknown 
is a lways much worse than fear o f the 
known. 
3. H ave the consent fo rm exec uted by the 
patient with any restrictions im posed by the 
pa tient noted th ereon. If there are any re-
~trictions these should also be noted in the 
chart. Incide ntally, if there is any subse-
quent cha nge as to any limitations o n the 
previo usly given consent , thi s sho uld be 
thoroughly and completely doc umented in 
the cha rt. 
Contract Liability. As a n adjunct to informed 
consent, let me give you a word o f caution with 
respec t to the assurances given to a patient. Courts 
have bee n seve re in judging phys ic ians who mi slead , 
in ad vertentl y o r otherwise, the ir pati ents in regard 
to the po tenti al se riousness o r re lati ve sim plic ity of 
a proposed p rocedure o r ope rati o n. Thus, the phy-
sic ian who ma kes such statements as, " No danger 
can result " or " It 's a perfectl y safe trea tment ," 
may be held liable eve n though the operation 
he pe rfo rm s is done with all due care and compe-
te ncy. Illustrati ve of thi s is a rece nt case from 
M ichigan ( 15), dec ided in 197 1, in which the 
pl a intiff was suffe ring fro m a peptic ulcer a nd con-
tac ted the defenda nt phys ic ia ns regarding a poss ible 
operation. The pa tient was never told th at he must 
have the operatio n, but the gist of what the defe ndant 
phys ic ia ns told him is the following: 
O nce you have an ope ra tion it take s ca re o f a ll 
your troubles. Y ou can eat as you wa nt to. you 
ca n drink as you wa nt to. you can go as you 
please. Dr . [XI a nd I are spec ia li sts. there is 
nothing to it at all - it 's a very si mple operation. 
Y o u'II be o ut o f wo rk three to fo ur wee ks at the 
most. T here is no da nge r a t a ll in thi s o pe ra ti o n. 
Afte r the o peratio n you ca n th row away yo ur pill 
box. In twenty years if yo u fig ure ou t what you 
spent fo r Maa lox pill s a nd doc to r ca ll s. you could 
buy a n awfu l lo t. Weigh it agai nst an o perati o n. 
The court held that such words a mo unted to an 
offer of a contrac t to achieve by the operation the 
conditi on desc ribed ; that in reliance on the desc rip-
t ion. the pl a intiff accepted the o ffer ; a nd that whe n 
these res ults in fact were not ac hieved . the contract 
cond itio n desc ribed was breached. A substantial jury 
verdict fo r the pla intiff based o n breach of contrac t 
was affi rmed. 
The majo rity op inion held that the question 
o f whethe r a contrac t ex ists is a question of fact 
fo r a jury in every insta nce. Obvio usly, if J his dec i-
sio n were to be fo llowed by other co urts, the effect 
could be d isastrous beca use it would severely limit 
phys ic ia ns in the ir effort s to assure patients and 
calm the ir norm al fea rs. There was a ve ry stro ng and 
well -reasoned dissent , and I would ho pe and expect 
that the attitude o f the majo rity o f the courts would 
not ex tend this holding to the normal p ractice of 
e nco uraging the patient with reasonable assurances 
which altho ugh they may at times be somewh at 
exagge rated , a re made with a the rapeutic intent. 
Captain-of-the-Ship or Respondeat Superior. 
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This now brings us to our next area of discussion . 
It involves a straight malpractice case with special 
emphasis on the Captain-of-the-Ship Doctrine or 
respondeat superior. The Captain-of-the-Ship Doc-
trine is based upon the long-accepted premise that 
the surgeon is in charge of all that takes place in the 
operating room and is, therefore , liable for it all. 
Respondeat superior simply means let the master 
respond for anything that his servants or employees 
may do. 
By way of illustration , let me refer to a case that 
occurred in California which clearly illustrates the 
broad umbrella of responsibility that is frequently 
applied. The anesthesia was being administered by 
a first-year resident who was under the immediate 
supervision of an anesthesiologist who was respon-
sible for supervising other operations at the same 
time. The anesthesiologist was a sala ried member of 
a private group of anesthesiologists , which group 
through its chief was responsible for the anesthesiol-
ogy training program. The residency program was 
under the joint sponsorship of the local hospital, the 
county hospital, and the state university. The chief 
of the anesthesiology group was out of the country 
at the time the incident occurred, but was ultimately 
responsible for the program and all that went on 
in connection with it . When suit was filed , the 
defendants included the resident, the supervising 
anesthesiologist, another anesthesiologist who came 
to their assistance, the chief of the group, the group 
itself, the local hospital, the county hospital, the state 
university, and the surgeons performing the opera-
tion. The case was ultim ately settled prior to trial 
with all parties contributing with the exception of 
the surgeons. Anoxia and cardiac arrest developed 
during surgery apparently due to several factors, 
all of which were the responsibility of those admin-
istering the anesthesia. Recognizing the distinct 
areas of separate responsibility which is gaining 
wider acceptance by the courts, the surgeons did 
not contribute to the ultimate settlement of the case. 
The right to control is the basis for liability in situ-
ations of this type, and it can be traced from the 
resident all the way through the various people or 
organizations participating in the training program. 
In spite of the broad implications of the Cap-
tain-of-the-Ship Doctrine, the courts pretty uniformly 
recognize the expertise of anesthesiologists and ex-
cept in very unusual situations, do not impose lia-
bility upon surgeons for anesthesia malpractice nor 
upon anesthesiologists for surgical malpractice. 
When the anesthesia is being administered by 
an anesthetist, we find less uniformity in the deci-
sions and a greater willingness on the part of some 
courts to impose liability upon the surgeon for the 
negligent administration of the anesthetic . There are 
two cases in point. One, Jackson v. Joyner (16), is a 
North Carolina case in which a nurse who was an 
employee of the hospital negligently administered the 
a nesthetic. The court held that while the operation 
was in progress, the surgeon had full power and 
control over all assisting nurses and that hence, the 
nurse administering the anesthetic stood in the posi-
tion of a borrowed servant to the surgeon for the 
purpose and duration of the operation . In the case 
of McKenney v. Tromly (17) the court held that it 
was an admitted fact that the surgeon had the abso-
1 ute right of control of all personnel in the operating 
room during the operation and hence, was liable for 
the negligence of any of these persons. These cases 
represent the extreme position and find their origin 
in the ready willingness of surgeons to testify that 
they are in absolute control of all that goes on in the 
operating room during the performance of the opera-
tion . This certainly is no longer true, and they are 
doi ng themselves a disservice by failing to recognize 
the distinct areas of responsibility that exist in present 
day medicine. 
Certified Regi stered Nurse Anesthetists 
(CRNA) are highly trained specialists with more 
training and experience in the field of anesthesiology 
than the vast majority of the surgeons. Thus, even 
in si tuations where CRNAs have administered the 
anesthetic , courts are recognizing their expertise and 
the separateness of their function. They follow the 
principle that where several doctors or nurses have 
distinct and separate parts to take which require 
the undivided attention of each, only the one who 
failed to use due care in the performance of the part 
assigned to him should be held responsible. This is 
true unless it can be shown that one exercises or has 
the right to control the other (18). 
In Virginia, the question of whether a hospital-
employed nurse/ anesthetist is an agent of the operat-
ing physician or the hospital is a question of fact to 
be determined by the jury and the main test, as in 
all agency situations, is who has the right to control 
(19). 
As you can see, all of the illustrations that have 
been given were not necessarily anesthesia cases. 
However, the legal principles involved would apply 
equally to you as anesthesiologists, and they do illus-
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tratc some of the more troublesome areas from a 
med ical legal poin t of view. 
J hope you will all become keenly aware of 
the problem of info rmed consent , and when you re-
turn to your respec ti ve hospitals, chec k and see 
what type consent fo rm s are now being used; see 
that they are updated, and do as some groups of 
anesthesiologists are doing and use your own con-
sent fo rm. Litigati on in the area of in fo rmed consent 
has only been going on fo r approxim ately 20 yea rs, 
and each year there has bee n an increase in the num-
ber of suits fil ed involving this problem. A good 
consent fo rm and an appropri ate di scuss ion between 
anesthesiologist and patient would go a long way in 
red uc ing the amount of litigation on thi s point. 
With respect to respondeat superior and vicari-
ous li ability. it is di ffi cult to predict how the courts 
will treat this in the future. However, I am certain 
there will be more and more judicial recogniti on of 
the ··a rea of expertise" principle. thus limiting li a-
bility to those ac tu ally performing a spec ific task. 
At the same time, you should not overl ook the fac t 
th at one negli gent ac t by a first-year res ident can 
start a domino th eory of li ability, and this is par-
ticul arl y true in the teac hing institutions. In such 
situations. there is no substitute fo r acti ve and cl oser 
supervision by th e teaching staff . 
Finally, let me remind you th at it is an integ ral 
part of your responsibility to keep your patients 
assured and their fea rs to a minimum. Howeve r, 
don't let your ex uberance and self-confidence ge t the 
best of you to the point th at you find yourself as the 
defend ant in a breach of contract ac ti on as did the 
phys icians in the Michigan case referred to. 
Thank you fo r your kind attention and I trust 
that you can continue to avoid the legal pit fa ll s some 
of my colleagues are constantly putting in your paths. 
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